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Syrian Civil Society during the Peace Talks in Geneva: Role and
Challenges
Zedoun Alzoubi
Union of Medical Care and Relief Organizations, Syria
Syrian civil society witnessed a new birth in 2011 following decades of hibernation due to
oppression. The fast growth and maturity of civil society organizations gave them the
opportunity to occupy a formal space in the ongoing peace talks in Geneva. The presence of
the Women’s Advisory Board, the Civil Society Support Room, and the recently established
Experts Room during the peace talks in the Palais de Nations allows them to influence the
negotiation process. This article is the first published documentation of the role of civil society
in the peace process and the challenges that face these talks.
___________________________________________________________________________

Civil society organizations (CSOs) witnessed a new birth during the current crisis in Syria.
Although some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were established before the crisis,
they were under the control of the Syrian government and took the form of charities. Before
the crisis Syrians rarely used the term “civil society” and considered its use a Western way of
culturally invading the country. The government, however, which preferred the term
“community-based organizations,” interfered in the appointment of their boards, controlled
their operations, and to some extent owned these organizations. Although this interference did
not prevent the formation of a few CSOs, such as the Syria Trust and the Syrian Enterprise and
Business Center, which were established and supervised by the First Lady, Asma Al-Assad, a
CSO sector in its generally accepted form cannot be considered to have existed before the
crisis.1
In the first six years of the crisis, the number of Syrian CSOs has at least doubled. Between
1959 and 2010, only 1,047 organizations were registered in Syria.2 After the start of the
uprising in 2011, however, many activists created CSOs in reaction to a range of issues. For
example, in response to the severity of the violence inflicted by government forces in the first
six months of the crisis, CSOs, such as the Syria Violations Documentation Center, undertook
to document human rights violations. Others tackled issues related to supporting people in
need. When pacifists found themselves sidelined after the transformation of the civil movement
into an armed conflict, especially after the second half of 2012, to compensate for the role they
had lost in the uprising, many of them established humanitarian and developmental CSOs.
Also, after the last quarter of 2012, many parts of Syria gradually slipped beyond government
control. When the opposition failed to establish a body to fill the vacuum that resulted from the
withdrawal of Syrian government agencies, CSOs stepped in.
January 12, 2014, was an important date for Syrian civil society. More than fifty Syrian
women convened in Geneva to launch the Syrian Women’s Initiative for Peace and Democracy
(SWIPD). The purpose of the initiative was to influence the Syrian peace talks in order to
protect women’s rights. A spokesman for the group explained: “We cannot remain silent
regarding events in Syria, such as daily death, massive destruction, starvation, displacement of
hundreds of thousands of families (in Syria and abroad); and the spread of terror, violence,
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ongoing detentions, acts of kidnapping, destruction of infrastructure and the spread of disease,
particularly among children.”3 But when Geneva II was held ten days later, Lakhdar Brahimi,
UN–Arab League Joint Special Representative for Syria, was unwilling to include any form of
civil society presence in the talks.4
Syrian civil society had to wait until early 2016 to have a role in the Geneva peace process.
Two spaces were created for women and CSOs on the sidelines of the talks. SWIPD became
part of the twelve-member Women’s Advisory Board (WAB) when the UN special envoy (SE),
Staffan De Mistura, invited six women from SWIPD and six from other women’s initiatives
and organizations to be his advisers on women’s issues and other matters.5 Also, another space
called the Civil Society Support Room (CSSR) was created to have meetings for the civil
society on the sidelines of the peace talks. More than twenty organizations, the majority of
which operate in opposition-controlled areas and few in government-controlled areas, were
invited to Geneva during the peace talks.
In Geneva IV, which took place between February 23 and March 5, a new space for civil
society was opened under the name the Experts Room. Twelve men, mainly academicians and
representatives of civil society, convened for the first time to discuss a constitution, a national
dialogue, and governance.6 Another group involved in the talks, called the Oslo Group, was
made up mainly of religious leaders and civil society activists. Unlike similar groups that stayed
“outside” the process during many other peace initiatives, this group was present in the Palais
de Nations during the talks, though it had no institutionalized presence in the talks.

Role of Civil Society in Geneva
Notably, civil society has gained a big space in the Syrian peace talks. Although it is common
to have civil society support the peace process,7 Geneva IV could be the first UN-led peace
talks in which civil society had an institutionalized presence. That presence was represented by
three spaces: the WAB, the CSSR, and the Experts Room. As defined by the Office of the
Special Envoy (OSE), the WAB had the clear task of providing the SE with advice about
women’s issues but also about other negotiated matters. The CSSR was expected to provide
advice on humanitarian, legal, and resilience and recovery matters.
The undeclared role of the WAB and the CSSR, however, was to create a track II
negotiation that fed directly to the negotiation process. Because the twelve women who made
up the WAB were from the government, the opposition, and Kurdish regions, they had a clearly
diverse set of political views and affiliations. The CSSR had a similar composition, though it
lacked any Kurdish, PYD affiliation.8
The importance of this undeclared role cannot be overstated. Before Geneva IV there had
been no direct negotiation between the Syrian government and the opposition. Beginning with
Geneva IV, however, these two spaces were the only place where various political issues were
directly negotiated, and the results immediately fed the ongoing, difficult peace talks. Also,
because of a Turkish veto against direct PYD representation, the WAB was the only space
where the Kurdish interest (specifically PYD) was present. Moreover, in the large areas where
government institutions did not exist and in other areas under government control where such
institutions were weak, civil society became the major service provider. Consequently, civil
society was closer to the people and, at least in opposition-held areas, better able to express
their needs than the negotiating parties.
The Experts Room held its first meetings in the fourth round of talks. This group was
supposed to discuss constitutional matters but was tasked this time with designing a national
dialogue conference. Its effectiveness is still unknown.
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Challenges
The greatest challenge for the current peace process has been the division of the country’s civil
society into three different civil societies. The first adopts the government narrative of the crisis
and operates mainly in government-held areas. The second adopts the opposition narrative and
operates from Gaziantep, Turkey, in opposition-held areas. The third operates in PYD-held
areas and supports that party’s narrative. A few organizations operate across the country, but
they do so with a low profile. Some other organizations are closer to the opposition narrative
but work in government-held areas. During the first four rounds of negotiation, the division
between the people who come from government-held areas and the people who come from
opposition-held areas was heavily reflected in the positions they took during the discussions.
On one hand, the people from government-held areas complained that they had less training
than people from opposition-held areas, and that those people were currently living outside the
country and were therefore less able to express the needs of the Syrian people. On the other
hand, people from opposition-held areas complained that they had been forced to leave the
country and were now living under extremely bad conditions, that their homes had been
destroyed by the government and its allies, and that their family members who remained in the
country were under heavy bombardment by the government and its allies.9 Also, the people
from the government side complained that organizations from opposition-held areas were
collaborating with the West in its sanctions against the Syrian government, and people from
opposition-held areas accused their counterparts of supporting the “brutal” Russian and Iranian
attacks on civilians and civil facilities in opposition-held areas. Very few organizations took a
middle ground on the subject of sanctions and attacks on civilians from both sides. Despite this
division, people from both sides were able to talk together and agree on principles and
documents. They were even able to socialize together. During the current round of negotiations,
however, socializing between the negotiating parties is impossible.
The second challenge for the current peace process was the need for the OSE to decide
whom to invite in order to get the right representation of civil society from among the three
“civil societies.” The first question was which CSOs are Syrian? Almost all CSOs from
opposition-held areas are not and cannot be registered in Syria. They are registered in Turkey,
Europe, or the United States. To avoid bank-transfer issues, some had to remove any form of
the word “Syria” from their name. Thus, De Mistura and his team committed to a wide range
of consultations with UN agencies and international NGOs with civil society spaces to ensure
that they invited a representative set of organizations. They also invited representatives of
Syrian civil society networks, such as the Syrian Civil Society Alliance, the Syrian Union of
Civil Society Organizations, the Syrian NGO Alliance, and the Public Union of Syrian
Charities and Organizations, all of which work in opposition-held areas. Similar networks in
government-held areas are still less structured. In the end, to achieve the best possible
representation, the OSE relied on advice from UN agencies operating in the country,
consultations with a wide range of activists, and a process of rotation to include as many
organizations as possible. The rotation process, however, posed another challenge related to
the continuity of the group and accumulation of knowledge.
A third challenge has been that the government delegation and the opposition delegation
have both opposed the presence of civil society in the negotiations, fearing it would undermine
their position in the peace process. De Mistura responded to this challenge by inviting two
women, one from the WAB and one from the CSSR, to the opening session on February 23,
2017. During his welcoming statement, he said that he wanted to remind the two delegations
about the importance of the presence of women in the talks. He may also have wanted to remind
his listeners of the importance of the presence of civil society in the Palais. Opposition to the
presence of civil society in the talks had come not only from the two delegations but also from
3
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civil society itself. During the second and third rounds of talks, some representatives of civil
society, mostly from the opposition side, vehemently attacked the WAB, accusing the group
of unbalanced representation, of providing nothing more than decoration, and of monopolizing
the women’s movement in Syria. Also, a strong movement in Gaziantep was initiated against
the presence of civil society in the talks, claiming that the civil society should defend the
opposition delegation and adopt the “revolution” narrative.10
A fourth challenge has been the imbalance in representation among the “three civil
societies.” CSOs working in opposition-held areas outnumber those coming from governmentand PYD-held areas. Organizations operating in PYD-held areas are hard to reach and do not
have representation in Gaziantep or Damascus, because the Turkish and Syrian governments
do not allow them to register. The WAB member from a PYD-held area, for example, must
cross the border illegally, timing her trip during dark nights, and then walk for hours to reach
Sulaimaniyya in Iraq in order to be able to come to Geneva. Furthermore, the government of
Syria has strongly discouraged organizations registered in Damascus from going to Geneva.
A final challenge involves passports and visas. Several people coming from Gaziantep had
no passports to travel, and the Swiss government, especially in the fourth round, tightened its
visa regulations, complicating several people’s efforts to obtain a visa to attend the talks.

Conclusion
The fourth round of peace talks ended on March 3, 2017, with a greater presence for civil
society. Thirty-nine people from various CSOs and academia tackled technical matters and
negotiated among themselves in support of the peace process. Although De Mistura and his
team are fully convinced of the importance of giving civil society a role in the negotiations,
and some evidence suggests that the presence of civil society with a direct link to the
negotiations is helpful, more data are needed before a definite assertion can be made. We must
wait to see how this role unfolds, taking into consideration the complexity of the Syrian context.
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